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Most studies of geographic variation in physician services have focused on surgery rates. Differences in these rates have been found to be substantial, even after adjustment for the population's age and sex. 1 Little is known about how much these differences contribute to the variation in total physician expenditures, however, and how much is due to other factors, such as higher prices or more intense diagnostic testing. Understanding why some locales spend more on physician services than others is particularly important in light of the recent decision to control physician spending in Medicare by means of "expenditure targets." The Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) recommended such targets, and Congress formally adopted them under the name of volume performance standards (VPS) as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989.
2 Each year, the secretary of health and human services (HHS) will determine a desired annual rate of increase in expenditures for physician services for the nation as a whole.
3 Failure to meet this standard may then result in lower fee increases for physicians in subsequent years. Beginning in 1991, two standards are used, one for surgical and one for all other physician services.
A policy such as the Medicare VPS assumes that a single rate of growth is desirable nationwide, regardless of current spending patterns. It is possible, however, that some areas may be spending "too much" on physician services; that is, some services may be inappropriate or unnecessary. Meanwhile, other areas may be spending "too little," a signal that patients have limited access to certain physician services. A single standard of expenditure growth could freeze these current relative spending levels, a policy that may be both inefficient and inequitable.
By decomposing, or breaking down, this variation in physician spending, we can better understand its implications for the Medicare VPS. If spending differences are driven by unexplained differences in service intensity, for example, then volume performance standards may be one D ATAWATCH 225 means of controlling volume. On the other hand, if spending differences are due in part to variations in the probability of any physician contacts, then such a policy could restrict access in some areas.
The purpose of this DataWatch is to decompose the variation in Medicare Part B expenditures per enrollee into its three parts: the number of users per enrollee, the number of services per user, and the price per service. We further decompose use and spending rates by type of service and by location of service. Special attention is focused on differences in physicians' propensity to admit patients to the hospital and the role this may play in driving up physician expenditures.
Methods. Ideally, this study would be based on a national sample of geographic areas in the United States. Unfortunately, existing Medicare data files are based on only a 5 percent sample of beneficiaries, too small to present an adequate picture of spending or use except in the largest metropolitan areas. Instead, we obtained 100 percent Medicare Part A and Part B claims data for ten states for 1987 (Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas-including that portion of Kansas City in Missouri-New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin). These states represent the nine U.S. census divisions, a mix of urban and rural areas, and 18 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries.
To assess the relative costliness of these ten states compared with all states, we calculated average per enrollee Part B spending for each state using the 1988 5 percent Part B Medicare Annual Data (BMAD) beneficiary file. Our states represent a fair range of high-and low-spending states, except for the least expensive states. The latter states (with ranks of thirty-sixth to fiftieth) were disproportionately located in the Rocky Mountain region.
Claims data were aggregated up to the level of the market area based on the beneficiary's place of residence, regardless of where the service was actually provided. Thus, all use and spending rates reported here are population-based. Market areas were defined as metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), "other urban" areas, and rural areas. Counties designated as other urban areas were those that, while not part of an MSA, included fairly large cities with substantial numbers of physicians. All remaining nonmetropolitan counties within a state were classified as rural. Ninety two market areas were analyzed in all: sixty-three MSAs, twenty-one "other urban" areas, and eight state-specific rural areas. Rural Connecticut and rural New Jersey were omitted due to border crossing.
Detailed information on spending and use by type of service, location of service, physician specialty, office and hospital visits, and selected procedures were retained on the file. Detailed data on physician inpatient expenditures were retained for the fifty-five most common diagnosis-related groups (DRGs); summary information was kept for the re-maining hospital admissions. All data were adjusted for area population age and sex differences, using the traditional direct method. 4 Data on the number of Medicare eligibles for each area were obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA's) eligibility files.
Because Part B claims were available only for the ten states under study, it is possible that physician spending could be underestimated for those areas in which residents routinely travel out of state for care. We were able to obtain all Part A claims for residents of our states, regardless of where they were actually hospitalized. We examined out-of-state admissions separately for each county in our states. If out-of-state admissions represented 15 percent or more of the county's total hospitalizations, those counties were deleted from the analysis. These were either rural counties or counties that were part of a larger MSA across the state border. The deleted counties represented 3 percent of the total Medicare population in our ten states. For the remaining areas, we imputed the expected Part B spending associated with out-of-state admissions and added this to the total expenditures for the area.
5 Since Medicare patients are probably more likely to travel out of state for hospital care than for ambulatory physician services, this should account for the vast majority of Part B spending actually incurred outside of our ten states.
Physician spending was defined as total allowed charges (including the deductible and copayments). Because of the heterogeneous nature of physician services, it is not possible to simply add up the number of services to obtain a measure of quantity. Instead, we constructed a price-weighted measure of quantity, using national relative allowed charges as weights. Each physician service is thus measured in relative value units (RVUs). The effect of this RVU measure will be to overstate the importance of surgery to any observed spending differences, compared with a measure constructed from resource-based relative values; however, the complete resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) was not available at the time this study was conducted. Our charge-based measure is also more consistent with other research to date.
Some amount of the variation in physician spending among areas may be due to geographic differences in physician practice costs. To adjust for these differences, we used the Geographic Practice Cost Index developed by Stephen Zuckerman and colleagues at The Urban Institute and adapted for use in the Medicare fee schedule.
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areas: from $472 in Enid, Oklahoma, to $852 in Phoenix, Arizona (in. 1987 dollars) . Adjusting for geographic practice cost differences compressed the range, but only slightly.
Difference in "high-cost" and "low-cost" areas. To decompose the spending differential across areas, we selected two groups for in-depth study: "high-cost" areas (those in the upper quartile of physician spending) and "low cost" areas (those in the bottom quartile). Exhibit 1 compares total spending and use per eligible in the high-and low-cost areas. Spending per eligible averaged 52 percent more ($271) in the high-cost areas than in the low-cost areas. Adjusting for practice costs lowered the differential to "only" 33 percent, or $194 more per eligible in the high-cost areas. The next three rows of the exhibit decompose spending per eligible into its three components: users per eligible, services per user, and price per service.
"Users per eligible" provides a measure of how many Medicare enrollees in an area actually receive physician services.
7 High-cost areas had more users per eligible, possibly suggesting greater access to care than in low-cost areas, but the magnitude of the difference was small. If low-cost areas had the same use rate as high-cost areas, the spending differential would have been only somewhat smaller: 31 versus 36 percent.
The dominant factor in explaining the spending differential across areas is the volume of services provided per user. The average recipient in high-cost areas received 32 percent more services than did the typical recipient in low-cost areas. Since our quantity measure is expressed as relative value units, it is not directly interpretable. However, since an intermediate office visit served as the base for the quantity index, we can say that patients received the equivalent of 8.9 more intermediate office visits in the high-cost areas. Finally, the nominal price per service was higher in high-cost areas as expected but was actually slightly lower once we adjusted for practice cost differences. (The price per service is simply Exhibit 2 decomposes the spending and volume differentials between high-and low-cost areas by type of service. The first two columns decompose the deflated $193.90 charge differential into the dollar shares and percentage shares by the major type of service categories, while the second two columns decompose the volume differential (that is, the 8.9 RVUs). Over two-fifths of the higher spending in high-cost areas (42.8 percent) could be attributed to direct patient contacts.
("Medical care" primarily consists of visits-for example, office visits or hospital visits.) Almost one-third was due to charges related to surgical procedures, and the remaining quarter was due to spending on ancillary tests. ("Other diagnostic tests" includes electrocardiograms, cardiac stress test, pulmonary function tests, echocardiography, and the like.)
Of course, some part of this spending differential could be due to higher prices for certain types of services. If the greater surgical spending levels in high-cost areas were due to higher surgeons' fees, for example, then we would expect that surgery would account for a smaller share of the volume differential than of the spending differential. In fact, the decompositions look almost identical; more patient contacts, more surgical procedures, and more diagnostic testing all contributed to the volume differential in roughly the same proportions as shown for their dollar shares.
Differences by location of service. Spending on physician services provided in the hospital accounted for almost 60 percent of the differential between high-and low-cost areas (Exhibit 3). By contrast, inpatient physician expenditures accounted for less than one-half of total spending for the ten states combined. Spending was higher for all types of inpatient services, but especially for hospital visits and surgery (not shown). One-quarter of the differential was spent in the office, primarily on office visits. Hospital visits alone accounted for 18 percent of the spending differential between high-and low-cost areas, while office visits accounted for 7 percent (Exhibit 4). Greater spending was largely due to greater quantity of visits; the "typical" enrollee in high-cost areas received 0.39 more office visits and more than one full additional hospital visit.
Impact of hospital use on physician spending. A combination of higher admission rates, longer stays, and higher bills per hospital episode have led to relatively high rates of spending on inpatient physician services in the high-cost areas. Exhibit 5 compares total hospital use rates. Admission rates were almost 9 percent higher in high-cost areas than in low-cost areas, while total hospital days per thousand population were an amazing 38 percent higher. The result was an additional $113 in Part B physician bills for every Medicare enrollee in the high-cost areas. One explanation for these higher admission rates could be a higher incidence of illness in the high-cost areas. For those patients who are hospitalized, however, there does not seem to be any difference in average case-mix between high-cost and low-cost areas.
Exhibit 6 presents admission rates, charges per admission, and charges per eligible for fifteen high-volume DRGs or DRG pairs. The next-tolast column shows the charge differential per eligible between the highcost and low-cost areas (with a minus indicating that the low-cost area is higher for that DRG). The last column shows the expected charge differential per eligible, if the high-cost areas had experienced the same admission rates as the low-cost areas. Admission rates were higher in the high-cost areas for all DRGs shown, except for major joint procedures and prostatectomy. As a result, Part B charges per eligible were higher for all of these admissions (except major joint procedures). Despite similar admission rates for prostatectomy, charges per eligible were still lower in the low-cost areas because of their lower charges per admission ($1,307 versus $1,474 per case). This study is clearly unable to explain the geographic differential in inpatient spending or to assess the medical appropriateness of this differential. The implications of these higher admission rates for total Part B spending are considerable, however, and suggest that future research is warranted. Higher rates of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, for example, combined with higher physician charges per admission, added three dollars in physician expenditures for every enrollee in highcost areas. This represented more than one percentage point of the spending differential. An admission rate for bypass surgery in high-cost areas identical to that in low-cost areas would have slashed this differential by four-fifths: from $2.99 to only $0.43 per eligible. Similarly, the propensity to admit patients for reconstructive vascular procedures, cardiac catheterization, or treatment of heart failure, and then to treat those patients more intensively, added nine dollars per eligible to the physician bill (the sum of the charge differentials for DRGs 110, 124/ 125, and 127). Had physicians admitted patients with these cardiovascular conditions at the same rate as their colleagues in low-cost areas, the charge differential would have been more than halved.
It is important to note, however, that admission and surgical rates were not uniformly higher in high-cost areas. As noted earlier, admissions for major joint procedures (primarily hip and knee replacements) were relatively more frequent in low-cost areas, as were admissions for cholecystectomy and hip fracture (not shown).
Exhibit 7 compares charges for physician services for two DRGS in which differential admission rates were less important as a factor: one surgical (major bowel procedures) and one medical (specific cerebrovas- Source: Medicare Part A and Part B claims from ten states, 1987. Note: All charges are Medicare Part B allowed charges, deflated for geographic differences in practice costs. a Individual charges may not sum to the total due to rounding. cular disorders-stroke). Physician charges were higher for all types of services in high-cost areas, compared with low-cost areas. Also, longer stays may have been one factor in driving up medical care costs; physicians in high-cost areas billed for more routine hospital visits as a result.
Variability in measurement of high-cost and low-cost areas. It is conceivable that area spending levels fluctuate somewhat randomly from year to year; if so, then a high-cost or a low-cost area in one year might be only average in the next year. We identified high-cost and low-cost areas from 1985 and 1986, using the same criteria used with the 1987 data (the top and bottom quartiles, respectively). We found considerable stability in the composition of these areas, at least over this short three-year time period. This implies that the relative ranking of areas (in terms of costliness) is not random from year to year, but probably reflects distinct inter-area patterns of care.
What happened to physician spending over this time period? Exhibit 8 compares physician spending in high-and low-cost areas for each of the three years. Spending per enrollee in high-cost areas grew 31 percent from 1985 to 1987, compared with 22 percent in the low-cost areas, actually widening the spending differential between areas over time. This suggests that area-specific VPS standards might be desirable. Ex- hibit 8 also displays spending for surgical services (using the VPS definition) and for all other physician services. The percentage changes over time mirror those of total physician spending; rates of increase are much faster in high-cost areas for both surgical and all other spending.
Suggestions For Policy Making
Substantial variation in Medicare physician spending exists across geographic areas. Even after we adjusted for differences in practice costs, spending per enrollee in the high-cost areas was 36 percent greater than in the low-cost areas. Somewhat surprisingly, the proportion of eligibles using physician services was only slightly higher in high-cost areas; relative spending levels appear to be driven largely by the quantity of services per user. Medicare patients in the high-cost areas received more services of every kind than did similar patients in low-cost areas.
A disproportionate share of the expenditure differential was spent in the hospital (58 percent, compared with 47 percent of total Part B spending). Higher admission rates for most DRGs appear to play a major role in driving up inpatient spending on physician services. Severity of illness is unlikely to be a major explanatory factor, for two reasons. First, all expenditure and use rates were adjusted for population age and sex differences. Second, systematic differences in overall admission rates and lengths-of-stay were also documented for individual DRGs, demonstrating consistently more intensive treatment of otherwise similar cases in high-cost areas. An alternative explanation is that Medicare patients in low-cost areas do not have needed access to hospital care. This is difficult to evaluate, given the evidence that some surgical admissions What do these differences imply for the Medicare VPS? The performance standards are designed to control spending, by encouraging physicians to monitor utilization. This is certainly the correct objective, given that the spending differential is largely due to differences in the quantity of services (rather than prices or user rates). Standards based on rates of increase, however, will do little to close the spending gap across areas and could even exacerbate it. This would be true, furthermore, for the surgical VPS and the "all other" VPS. Instead, targets would need to be tied to current levels of use, with low-volume areas permitted higher updates and high-volume areas given smaller (even negative) updates.
Finally, our results suggest that controlling hospital use, particularly admission rates, could have significant secondary impacts by reducing physician expenditures. Thus, policymakers should consider a volume performance standard that encompasses Medicare Part A and Part B.
